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According to Eleonore Stump, Thomas Aquinas rejects a “popular” (roughly, 
penal substitutionary) account of the atonement. For Stump’s Aquinas, God 
does not require satisfaction or punishment for human sin, and the function 
of satisfaction is remedial, not juridical or penal. Naturally, then, Aquinas 
does not, on this reading, see Christ’s passion as having saving effect in virtue 
of Christ substitutionally bearing the punishment for human sin that divine 
justice requires. I argue that Stump is incorrect. For Aquinas, divine justice 
does require satisfaction; satisfaction involves punishment ( poena) and has a 
penal function; and one way Christ’s death has saving effect is in virtue of his 
satisfying that requirement on people’s behalf. Christ saves by “paying our 
debt,” bearing in the place of humans the penalty or punishment required 
by divine justice. My argument implies that Aquinas’s account of satisfaction 
in the atonement significantly resembles key aspects of Stump’s “popular ac-
count”—and of the Penal Substitution Theory it represents.
Introduction
In her presentation of Thomas Aquinas’s account of the atonement, 
Eleonore Stump contrasts Aquinas’s account with a “popular account” 
of the atonement. According to that popular account, Christ’s death has 
saving effect in virtue of his bearing for sinners, in their place, the penalty 
of punishment for sin that God, in his justice, required.1 Though Stump 
1Stump, Aquinas, chap. 15. Stump defines the “popular account” as follows:
Human beings by their evil actions have offended God. This sin or offense against 
God generates a kind of debt, a debt so enormous that human beings by them-
selves can never repay it. God has the power, of course, to cancel this debt, but 
God is perfectly just, and it would be a violation of perfect justice to cancel a debt 
without extracting the payment owed. Therefore, God cannot simply forgive a 
person’s sin; as a just judge he must sentence all people to everlasting torment as 
the just punishment for their sin. God is also infinitely merciful, however; and so 
he brings it about that he himself pays their debt in full, by assuming human na-
ture as the incarnate Christ and in that nature enduring the penalty which would 
otherwise have been imposed on human beings. In consequence, the sins of ordi-
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admits that Aquinas’s account of the atonement sometimes sounds similar 
to this popular account, she claims that the similarity is only “superficial;” 
according to Stump, the two accounts are actually completely different.2
As I show in Section I, Stump makes three claims about Aquinas’s ac-
count to substantiate her claim that Aquinas and the popular account do 
not agree. Those claims are the following:
S1) For Aquinas, God does not require satisfaction for the remission of 
human sin;
S2) For Aquinas, the aim of satisfaction is remedial, and not juridical; 
its aim is to restore love in the wrong-doer’s will, rather than to 
fulfill a requirement of justice;
S3) For Aquinas, Christ’s death, as a work of satisfaction, functions in 
virtue of Christ serving as a template of love and obedience (one 
which elicits our love), rather than in virtue of his fulfilling a re-
quirement on our behalf by bearing our punishment.
As Stump contends throughout her exposition of Aquinas’s account, S1–S3 
set Aquinas’s account of the atonement off from the so-called popular ac-
count of the atonement.
After briefly noting in Section II the fact that others agree with Stump’s 
reading and that Stump’s popular account is more or less a cipher for a 
Penal Substitution Theory (PST) of the atonement,3 I argue in Sections III–
VI that Stump’s interpretation is incorrect; Aquinas, in fact, affirms each of 
the three notions Stump takes him to deny. That is, I argue that:
A1) For Aquinas, divine justice (based on the divine will) requires sat-
isfaction for the remission of sin.
A2) For Aquinas, satisfaction has a juridical function: it involves under-
going punishment for sin required by divine justice, a requirement 
“satisfied” by the undergoing of that punishment.
A3) For Aquinas, one way in which Christ’s death has saving effect 
is that he bears the punishment required by justice for us, in our 
place, thereby freeing us from our debt of punishment.
In Section VII, I observe that A1–A3 undermine Stump’s attempt to mark 
Aquinas account off from the popular account and the Penal Substitution 
Theory it tends to represent. In fact, A1–A3 show that Aquinas’s account 
of the Christ’s death, in its function as a work of satisfaction, substantially 
resembles a PST—though, as I concede, a more definitive statement about 
nary human beings are forgiven; and, by God’s mercy exercised through Christ’s 
passion, human beings are saved from sin and hell and brought to heaven. (427)
2Stump, Aquinas, 440. 
3See Section II, especially footnote 26, for discussion of the relation of the popular account 
to PST.
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the relation of Aquinas’s account to PST requires a separate and rigorous 
consideration.4
To be clear at the outset, note the following: my argument for A1–A3 
against Stump’s S1–S3 does not form an objection to Stump’s helpful 
treatment of the other positive functions of Christ’s death in Aquinas’s 
account. Indeed, Aquinas’s multifaceted account, with its numerous ben-
efits and modes of efficacy—which Stump helpfully conveys—make that 
ill-advised.5 Rather, my dispute is restricted to Stump’s denials: i.e., to her 
claim that Aquinas does not, in contradistinction to the “popular account,” 
think that Christ’s atonement functions in virtue of Christ’s bearing in 
humanity’s place the punishments required by God’s justice. I argue that 
Aquinas does admit this as one of the atonement’s many functions.
I. Stump’s Reading of Aquinas on the Atonement
In her exposition of Aquinas’s account (which doubles as a case for differ-
entiating Aquinas’s from the popular account of the atonement) Stump’s 
first key claim is that, unlike the popular account which sees God as con-
strained by his justice to punish sin unless satisfaction be made, Aquinas 
holds that God does not require satisfaction for human sin.6 (Note: Stump 
does not explicitly define satisfaction, but she seems to understand it as 
the act of offering “compensatory payment” or of “making restitution” for 
the injury one has caused another. So, for example, if a boy trampled his 
mother’s flower garden, satisfaction could consist in repairing the flower 
bed to at least its original condition).7 In support of her contention that, for 
Aquinas, God does not require satisfaction, Stump points to Summa Theo-
logiae (ST) III.46.2. There Aquinas argues that God could have delivered 
humans without satisfaction, reasoning in the following way:
If God remits sin . . . he does no one an injury, just as any human being who, 
without [requiring] satisfaction, remits an offence committed against him-
self does not act unjustly but is merciful.8
From this text, Stump infers that “it is not necessary that satisfaction be 
made for human sins.”9 God does not require it; he is “free . . . to forego it.”10
4I take up this task in an essay currently in preparation. 
5Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [ST] III.48.1–4 gives four different ways by which Christ’s 
death has salvific efficacy. 
6Stump, Aquinas, 431. 
7Stump, Aquinas, 437–438. Stump speaks of “undoing his mischief” and “fixing the 
damage.” In some satisfaction theories of the atonement, it may be important to distinguish 
between restoring the goods which one has “stolen” or otherwise taken from the victim, and 
that of offering some compensation, above and beyond that restoration, to “make up” for 
the fact that an injury was caused at all. As far as I can tell, this distinction is not important 
to Stump’s account.
8Stump, Aquinas, 431; ST III.46.2 ad.3.
9Stump, Aquinas, 431.
10Stump, Aquinas, 432. 
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The interpretation appears plausible. One could also appeal to Aquinas’s 
claims that it was possible for God to have restored human nature with no 
incarnation at all—and, presumably, therefore, with no act of satisfaction.11
But if God is not unwaveringly committed to “damn[ing] human 
beings unless [satisfaction] be made,” then the problem, Stump claims, is 
not on God’s side of the divine-human relationship; instead, the problem 
caused by sin lies on the human end, with human nature.12 Thus, since 
satisfaction addresses the problem in the divine-human relationship, and 
the problem is on “our side,” satisfaction aims at overcoming a problem 
or obstacle on the human end of the divine-human relationship.13 And the 
specific problem there (at least the one rooted in our past sin) is the fact 
that our wills have turned away from God. So Stump’s second major claim 
is that the aim of satisfaction is the healing or restoration of love in the wrong- 
doer’s will.14
This aim of satisfaction can be understood by considering cases of injury 
within interpersonal relationships. When one person maliciously wrongs 
a friend (or inadvertently wrongs her friend but then feels no remorse for 
her act), the friendship is broken in an important way. Whether the goods 
taken by the perpetrator are restored to the victim may or may not be nec-
essary for the restoration of the relationship; what is necessary is for love 
to be restored in the wrong-doer, for the will of the wrong-doer to turn back 
to her friend in love, since that mutual love is an important, constitutive 
ingredient of that friendship. Moreover, when one undertakes to undo the 
damage she has caused another, her will may be transformed in this very 
undertaking. The external act can help draw out the needed internal state. 
And for Stump, this internal change is the point of satisfaction.
To support her claim regarding the function of satisfaction in Aquinas, 
Stump points to the fact that satisfaction is part of the sacrament of pen-
ance, which, for Aquinas, “aims primarily at the restoration of friendship 
between the wrong-doer and the one wronged.”15 She writes, “Aquinas 
sees penance in general as a kind of medicine for sin.” She quotes ST III.90 
in support: “The detestation of [one’s] past sins belongs to penance, to-
gether with the purpose of changing [one’s] life for the better, which is, as 
it were, the goal of penance.”16
11ST III.1.2, an article on “whether it was necessary for the restoration of the human race 
that the Word of God should become incarnate.”
12Stump, Aquinas, 432. 
13Stump, Aquinas, 432.
14Stump, Aquinas, 432. Stump distinguishes between various problems in the di-
vine-human relationship having to do with sin. There is the problem of “past sin” and 
“future sin,” and Christ’s work of satisfaction solves the first. 
15“On [the popular account], the problem with the sins a person . . . has committed is that 
they have resulted in God’s-alienation from [that person] and in God’s consequent inability 
to refrain from punishing him, without satisfactions having been made. But, on Aquinas’s 
account, [the sinner] is alienated from God, who is free to require satisfaction or to forego it; 
and the problem is a problem in human nature” (Stump, Aquinas, 432).
16Stump, Aquinas, 432. 
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What is especially important for the purpose of my argument is that 
Stump thinks that the remedial function of satisfaction excludes or dis-
places its juridical one, that is, its involving the “payment” of a penalty 
that justice requires be paid. Or at least Stump often frames her claim this 
way, playing the one function off against the other. The popular account, 
with its claims that God requires that satisfaction be made and that pun-
ishments be dispensed, envisages God as a kind of cosmic “accountant 
keeping double-column books on the universe. When a person commits a 
sin, a debt of guilt is registered in one column which must be balanced on 
the same line in the other column by the payment of a punishment which 
compensates for the guilt.”17 Aquinas’s conception of God, on the other 
hand, “is more nearly analogous to a parent than to an accountant.” For 
Stump, this kind of good parent is not concerned with “trying to keep the 
spiritual books of the household balanced;” rather, “the parent’s concern 
is with the child, that the child develop into the best person she can be 
and that there be a loving relationship between the child and her parent.” 
Consequently, “any punishing, then, is strictly a means to the end of making 
the child a good person in harmony with the parent.”18 To return the analogy 
to God, “God,” for Stump’s Aquinas, “is not concerned to balance the ac-
counts. He is concerned with the sinner. What he wants is for that person 
to love what God loves and to be in harmony with God. His aim, then, is 
to turn that person around.”19 So, she contends that for Aquinas, the point 
and purpose of satisfaction is “to return the wrongdoer’s will to confor-
mity with the will of the person wronged, rather than to inflict retributive 
punishment on the wrongdoer.”20
These two claims—that God does not require satisfaction and that the 
aim and function of satisfaction is the restoration of love in the sinner, 
rather than the fulfilling of a requirement of justice, say, that sin be penal-
ized or punished—are the basis of how Stump’s Aquinas thinks Christ’s 
death functions. Christ’s death is a work of “vicarious satisfaction,”21 
a case of one person acting to repair the damages another has caused. 
According to Stump, the important concern in vicarious satisfaction (at 
least in the context of loving interpersonal relationships) is not repairing 
the damages, but rather, repairing the will of the wrong-doer. A person’s 
act of vicarious satisfaction can help solve that problem. For insofar as 
one “allies” herself with the other who makes satisfaction on her behalf, 
17Stump, Aquinas, 436.
18Stump, Aquinas, 436. (emphasis mine).
19Stump, Aquinas, 437.
20Stump, Aquinas, 435. Cf. 432 as well: “The function of satisfaction for Aquinas is not to 
placate a wrathful God or in some other way remove the constraints which compel God to 
damn sinners. Instead, the function of satisfaction is to restore a sinner to a state of harmony 
with God by repairing or restoring in the sinner what sin has damaged.” Also, 437: “the aim 
of any satisfaction . . . is not to make debts and payments balance but to restore a sinner to 
harmony with God.”
21Stump, Aquinas, 434 ff.
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insofar as one sees and feels her substitute’s actions to be a fulfillment 
of a restitution she owed, wanted, and needed to provide, then the real 
problem of the wrong-doer’s unloving, disharmonious will would be 
solved. “On this view, a person making vicarious satisfaction is not pro-
viding compensatory payment so much as acting the part of a template 
representing the desired character or action, in accordance with which the 
sinner can align his own will and inclinations to achieve a state of mind 
[i.e., a restored love toward God] which it is at least unlikely” for him to 
have achieved apart from the initiative and work of the substitute.22 This 
is how Christ’s death functions as a work of satisfaction.
Again, it is Stump’s attendant denial which is important for my argu-
ment. She writes the following:
According to Aquinas, God does not require the penalties for sins either 
from human beings or from Christ. God does not inflict Christ’s suffering 
on Christ as a punishment for human sins; rather God receives it as an act 
of making satisfaction whose goal is the alteration of human intellects and 
wills.23
Christ does not atone by “[paying] the full penalty for all human sin so 
that human beings would not have to pay it.”24 He does not atone by 
paying a debt of punishment for humanity that God requires to be paid.
Such are Stump’s three main claims by which she presents Aquinas’s 
account, and, at the same time, by which she argues that Aquinas does 
not hold (and at places even rejects) the popular account. In what follows, 
I argue that each of Stump’s negative claims about Aquinas is incorrect.
II. Framing the Significance of Stump’s Interpretation
Before turning to evaluate the first of Stump’s claims, I offer two brief 
observations which frame the significance of her interpretation. First, 
Stump’s “popular account” is not merely some popular-level theology of 
the “unreflective.”25 Rather, it more or less represents a penal substitu-
tionary theory (PST).26 Both PST and the popular account maintain that 
God’s justice requires some penalty or punishment for sin; that Jesus bears 
this penalty or punishment on the cross; that he thereby satisfies the re-
quirement of justice for humans, in their stead; and that by so satisfying 
22Stump, Aquinas, 437.
23Stump, Aquinas, 440.
24Stump, Aquinas, 428–429.
25Stump, Aquinas, 427.
26Stump’s popular account likely represents not just PST, but also “Anselmian” accounts 
of the atonement generally, constituted as such by their holding i) that God has some re-
quirement which must be fulfilled before he will resume fellowship with humans who have 
sinned; ii) that the reality of this requirement constitutes a plight for human beings; and iii) 
that Christ’s death solves that predicament. PST is seen as a kind of variation on this more 
general Anselmian type. It is important to acknowledge that some construals of PST might 
not endorse all aspects of the popular account.
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the requirement, he delivers humans from their plight, in the manner of 
paying their “debt.”
Second, it is important to note that Stump is not alone in her interpre-
tation of Aquinas. Thomistic scholar Romanus Cessario voices a similar 
view. After reviewing how Aquinas understands Christ’s death as the 
sacrificial offering of a perfectly loving, submissive, humble and obedient 
will to God, Cessario concludes:
Aquinas offers no support for those who would advance a theory of penal 
substitution as the mechanism by which the benefits of Christ reach the hu-
man race. Love, not punishment, dominated Aquinas’s account of the effica-
cy of the Passion.27
Another interpreter, Rik van Nieuwenhove, also agrees: “It is a gross 
misreading” he states, “to understand ‘making satisfaction’ in terms of 
retribution and punishment.”28 Like Stump, Van Nieuwenhove not only 
thinks Aquinas conceives of satisfaction in personalistic terms rather than 
juridical ones, he also appeals to the remedial nature of penance to un-
dermine any penal undertones of satisfaction. Penance “is described as 
‘a spiritual healing of a sort’ . . . or as ‘a spiritual medicine,’” and “sin is 
called ‘a sickness of the soul.’” “These metaphors reveal . . . a world of 
difference: whereas a judge punishes, a doctor heals.”29 Thus, according 
not only to Stump, but also to other prominent interpreters, Aquinas un-
derstands the function of Christ’s death without reference to a justice that 
requires punishment for sin.
In what follows, I will attempt to show that Stump and those who agree 
with her on the nature and function of satisfaction, particularly in the 
atonement, are reading Aquinas incorrectly. 
III. Aquinas on the Necessity of Satisfaction
Stump’s first claim (S1) is a proposed answer to the question of whether 
God, for Aquinas, requires satisfaction—that is, of whether God’s justice 
requires satisfaction for the remission of sin. Aquinas is surprising clear on 
27Cessario, “Aquinas on Christian Salvation,” 124. It is possible that Cessario’s account 
may escape my objections to Stump’s account of Aquinas. Cessario admits what I argue 
below: that satisfaction “responds . . . to the needs of the divine justice” (122). (However, 
he later says that “this arrangement is not binding on God,” which, as I will argue, seems 
inaccurate in an important way). And perhaps his comments about penal substitution have 
in view aspects of PST outside the “basic PST” which I see Aquinas as accepting (see Sec-
tion VII). Finally, perhaps his claim about the place of love and punishment in Aquinas’s 
view is merely about Thomistic emphasis. That said, he at least seems to share Stump’s view 
in important ways. He suggests that the idea that “salvation is a matter of restitution and 
punishment” is a distortion (126). He holds that Aquinas does not present “a vengeful God 
who exacts a terrible punishment from an innocent victim” (125). I do not suggest that 
Aquinas portrays God as “vengeful;” Aquinas may even think that God does not exact the 
punishments that Christ bears. But we must consider separately whether Christ satisfies 
a requirement of punishment, bearing our punishments in our place for the sake of that 
requirement of divine justice. 
28Van Nieuwenhove, “The Saving Work of Christ,” 439.
29Van Nieuwenhove, “The Saving Work of Christ,” 439.
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this question. In his Compendium Theologiae (CT), he writes, “If God were 
to have restored human beings only by his will and power, the order of 
divine justice, which requires satisfaction for sins, would not be observed.”30 He 
is especially explicit in Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG): “The order of divine 
justice . . . requires that God should not remit sin without satisfaction.”31
How is one to square these texts with ST III.46.2, which Stump (and, to 
some extent, Cessario)32 cites in support of the opposite claim that God does 
not require satisfaction? ST III.46.2 considers the question of “Whether 
there was any other possible way of human deliverance besides the 
passion of Christ.” And indeed, in that article, Aquinas emphasizes an af-
firmative answer: there was another way—which is to say that satisfaction 
was not necessary. While Aquinas expresses this claim in the body of his 
answer (the respondeo), a forceful line of reasoning in support of it is given 
in the replies to the objections. Stump cites the reply:
[Reply to Objection 3:] A judge who has to punish a fault committed against 
another . . . cannot remit the fault or penalty without injustice. But God has 
no one superior to him; rather he himself is the highest and universal good 
of the whole world. And for this reason, if [God] remits sin, which is defined 
as a fault from its being committed against [God] himself, he does no one an 
injury, just as any human being who, without [requiring] satisfaction, remits 
an offense committed against himself does not act unjustly but is merciful.33
But, as I will now argue, the passage, read carefully and contextually, does 
not suggest what Stump takes it to suggest; it does not suggest that God 
“does not require satisfaction” or that God is “free to forego it.”
Consider first the objection to which the passage just mentioned replies:
[Objection 3:] God’s justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion 
in order that man might be delivered from sin. But Christ cannot let His 
justice pass . . . since He is justice itself. It seems impossible, then, for man to 
be delivered otherwise than by Christ’s passion.
This objection, and the others that similarly seem to suggest that Christ’s 
passion was necessary, meet a strong opposition in the article’s sed contra:
[On the contrary:] Augustine says (De Trin. 13): [While] we assert that the 
way whereby God . . . delivered us [namely, Christ’s pasion] . . . is both good 
30Compendium Theologiae [CT] 200, as translated by Regan, 150; emphasis mine. 
31IV.54.9.
32On the one hand, Cessario recognizes that in ST III.46.2 Aquinas’s point is that God 
could have decided “to free man from sin in some other way than by the sufferings of Christ” 
(Cessario, “Aquinas on Christian Salvation,” 122). On the other hand, Cessario also thinks 
that in the passage, Aquinas says that “this arrangement is not binding on God.” He sees 
Aquinas as “preserving” “the absolute freedom of divine love as it communicates itself in 
the world.” However, as I explain below, Aquinas thinks that once God has willed, the matter 
becomes necessary since God cannot change his will. Thus God is not free “at this point” to 
merely liberate a person from sin without satisfaction. In that sense, God does not “preserve” 
his freedom with a “non-binding” requirement. 
33Stump, Aquinas, 431. This translation of ST III.46.2.ad3 appears to be Stump’s own. 
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and befitting . . . let us also show that other possible means were not lacking 
on God’s part, to whose power all things are equally subordinate.
Aquinas’s own answer (respondeo) steers a middle course between the 
opening objections and this testimony from Augustine. Aquinas begins 
his answer saying the following:
[I answer that:] A thing may be said to be possible or impossible in two ways: 
first of all, simply and absolutely; or secondly, from supposition. Therefore, 
speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind 
otherwise than by the Passion of Christ. . . . Yet it was impossible if some 
supposition be made.
With Aquinas’s “yes and no” answer in place, we see the importance of the 
opening lines of Aquinas’s “reply to objection 3,” lines which Stump fails 
to quote:
Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from 
the human race. But if [God] had willed to free man from sin without any 
satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice.34
With these words, Aquinas’s concedes the premise of the third objection: 
God’s justice did require satisfaction. Yet the conclusion that Christ had to 
die does not follow because “even this justice depends on the divine will.” 
The suggestion is that Christ did not, “absolutely speaking,” have to die, 
because justice did not, absolutely speaking, have to require satisfaction. 
Justice is based on God’s will, the content of which, apparently, was not 
itself necessary.
Aquinas’s talk of alternative possibilities as to what justice could re-
quire, and his talk of justice and its requirements “being based on the 
divine will,” clearly draws on his discussion of divine free will in ST I.19. 
There, Aquinas considers two kinds of things that God wills: viz., his own 
goodness and things apart from himself. The former he wills necessarily, 
but the latter he wills “in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness 
as their end.”35 But “in willing an end,” Aquinas reasons, it is necessary 
that we will some means only if that means is necessary to attaining the 
end. Therefore, since God’s goodness “can exist without other things,” “it 
follows that [God’s] willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely 
necessary.”36 This conclusion is important because Aquinas explains later 
in the question that “God has free will with respect to what He does not 
necessarily will.” Thus, on Aquinas’s terms, the basis of his claim in ST 
III.46.2 that Christ’s satisfaction was not “absolutely necessary” is that 
God’s requirement of satisfaction is an act of divine free will. Cessario 
appears correct when he observes that Aquinas’s claim “exhibits a shift in 
theological interpretation. For Anselm . . . the thought of God forgiving 
34These words immediately precede the section of “reply to objection 3” quoted above. 
35ST I.19.3.
36ST I.19.3.
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sin without punishment necessarily implies a disorder.”37 For Aquinas, 
however, God requires satisfaction (to borrow the formula from ST 1.19.3) 
neither by his nature, nor contrary to his nature, but rather, voluntarily.”38
While Aquinas maintains that satisfaction is not “absolutely” necessary 
but instead was a matter of divine free will, nevertheless as ST I.19 and 
ST III.46.1–2 explain, there is for Aquinas an important sense in which the 
requirement of satisfaction for sin was and is necessary—namely, necessary 
“by supposition.” “Supposing that God wills a thing, then He is unable 
not to will it, as His will cannot change.”39 Supposing, then, that God has 
willed to require satisfaction, which Aquinas indicates God has done (by 
his “ordinance” for creation), then it is indeed necessary that satisfaction 
be made.40 Hence, the opening lines of “reply to objection 3” are coun-
terfactual in nature: “If [God] had willed to free man from sin without 
satisfaction, he would not have acted against justice.” Aquinas in no way 
suggests that “after” God’s ordinance for creation, he is “free to forego” 
satisfaction. Thus, the text to which Stump points (ST III.46.2.ad3) does 
not undermine Aquinas’s clear claims—not only in CT and SCG, but also 
in the very article from which the cited passage is drawn—that divine 
justice requires satisfaction; instead, the text notes that this requirement of 
satisfaction by divine justice is something God freely willed.41
IV. Aquinas (and Anselm) on Justice, Satisfaction and Punishment
Stump was able to maintain that satisfaction had a purely remedial func-
tion because she first held that God did not require satisfaction. The same 
logic holds for my account, only in reverse: my establishing that God does 
require satisfaction in Aquinas’s account suggests that satisfaction has 
more-than-remedial function in that account. Satisfaction somehow up-
holds the order of justice. Aquinas does not merely leave us to infer this 
additional function of satisfaction; rather, he makes the point explicitly 
in discussing the nature of penance in ST Supp 12.42 (This is particularly 
interesting because Stump and Van Nieuwenhove appeal to satisfaction’s 
being part of penance to suggest just the opposite, viz., that it has only a 
remedial function.)
37Cessario, “Aquinas on Christian Salvation,” 122.
38ST I.19.3.ad3 “It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not 
will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.”
39ST I.19.3.
40Aquinas speaks in ST III.46.2 of God’s “ordinance” as one of the things whose supposi-
tion implies necessity.
41Stump’s error comes when she drops the counterfactual framework of ST III.46.ad3 and 
concludes, “So, on Aquinas’s view, it is not necessary that satisfaction be made for human 
sins” (Stump, Aquinas, 431; emphasis mine). 
42Though compiled after his death from earlier writings, the way that the account out-
lined in ST Supp. 12 coheres with Aquinas’s other writing tells in favor of the assumption 
that its account of the aim of satisfaction represents Aquinas’s established views. 
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In ST Supp 12, Aquinas considers the question, “Whether satisfaction 
is an act of justice?” By reference to the nature of justice and of satisfac-
tion, he quickly delivers the affirmative answer.43 In the remainder of the 
article, Aquinas pursues a more detailed account of satisfaction’s relation 
to justice. He notes first that satisfaction “expresses equality in the agent,” 
and as such “denotes, properly speaking, an act of justice of one man to 
another.”44 Then, noting that justice toward another can involve external 
goods or merely actions, Aquinas specifies that satisfaction has to do 
with actions, specifically with doing something that “equalizes” one’s past 
unjust action.45 As such, a person’s making satisfaction presupposes that 
that person had previously failed to act toward another in a just way. This 
failure of justice is an “inequality” which “constitutes an offense; so that 
satisfaction regards a previous offense.” He then immediately adds that 
“no part of justice regards a previous offense, except vindictive justice.” 
Implicitly anticipating an objection, he explains that the fact that satis-
faction is self-imposed—that “the penitent holds to the penance”—is no 
obstacle to satisfaction being an act of vindictive justice (iustitia vindica-
tiva), “since vindictive justice establishes equality indifferently, whether 
the patient be the same subject as the agent, as when anyone punishes 
himself, or whether they be distinct, as when a judge punishes another 
man.” He concludes that penance itself is “in a way a species of vindic-
tive justice. This proves that satisfaction, which implies equality in the 
agent with respect to a previous offense, is a work of justice, as to that part 
which is called penance.”
Importantly, when Aquinas speaks of vindictive justice, he speaks of 
one being punished. The suggestion is that satisfaction involves (perhaps 
among other things) voluntarily46 inflicting a punishment on oneself, 
and that this undergoing of punishment establishes justice by equalizing 
one’s prior offence. I will argue below that Aquinas elsewhere explicitly 
endorses this suggestion, which we see only implicitly here. (Indeed, in 
the subsequent article, ST Supp. 12.3, Aquinas speaks of satisfaction as 
“the act of justice inflicting punishment”). But first it will be helpful to 
43He writes, “Justice is considered with regard to an equation between thing and thing 
according to a certain proportion;” and satisfaction, by its very name (“enough”), “denotes 
an equality of proportion.” It follows that, formally, “satisfaction is an act of justice.”
44In those elaborations (ST Supp.12.2), Aquinas explains that there are two kinds of acts of 
justice: commutative and distributive (i.e., those where a person gives to another that which 
is due the other, and those where a person, acting as a judge, establishes justice between two 
others. Cf. ST II-II.61.1). In these two kinds of acts of justice, the justice, or new equality, is 
“taken up” in different places: in the first, it is established in the agent; in the second, it is 
established in the subject who has suffered injustice. Aquinas presents this observation to 
explain why satisfaction is an act of commutative justice. 
45So, while we might think that the important part of satisfaction is the state in which the 
goods are restored to the victim, Aquinas think that satisfaction properly concerns the act of 
wrongdoer.
46See below for a discussion of Aquinas’s explanation of how satisfactory punishment 
can be voluntary, given that he sees punishment as involving an aspect of involuntariness. 
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head off an objection to this interpretation of Aquinas’s understanding of 
satisfaction.
One might object to the interpretation of satisfaction I have suggested 
(namely, that satisfaction involves voluntarily assuming punishments that 
satisfy an order of justice) by arguing that the concept of satisfaction is 
determined by Anselm (who first espoused the “satisfaction” theory of the 
atonement) and that Anselm frames satisfaction as an alternative to pun-
ishment. Indeed, Anselm does frame satisfaction in this way. Anselm holds 
that when a person wrongs God by “robbing God of his honor,” the justice 
of the “order of things” over which God presides can be upheld either by 
God punishing the wrongdoer, or by the wrongdoer (or someone else) 
providing “satisfaction,” something which God considered sufficiently 
good to compensate for the sin. Thus, for Anselm, divine justice requires 
punishment or satisfaction—and satisfaction is clearly presented as an 
alternative to punishment.47 If Aquinas’s account of satisfaction follows 
Anselm’s, then there must be a mistake in the argument that Aquinas un-
derstands satisfaction as involving punishment.
The solution to this objection is to recognize that Aquinas’s concep-
tion of satisfaction differs from Anselm’s. Whereas Anselm conceives of 
satisfaction and punishment as alternatives, holding that divine justice 
requires one or the other, Aquinas conceives of satisfaction as involving pun-
ishment. As such, he holds throughout his writings (in SCG, ST, and CT) 
that divine justice simply requires punishment.48 “Divine justice requires, 
for the preservation of equality in things, that punishments [poenae] be as-
signed for faults; “the order of justice demands that a punishment [poena] 
47See Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, at, for example, I.13: “Necessarily, then, when God’s honor 
is taken away [i.e., the essential feature of sin for Anselm], either it is paid back [which is 
satisfaction] or else punishment follows.” He speaks of God enforcing a requirement of “ei-
ther repayment or punishment.” Note also Millard Erickson’s remark that in the developing 
medieval penitential system, one could “by rendering some form of satisfaction . . . avoid 
punishment for one’s offenses. This was in keeping with a legal principle of the time: in 
matters of private offense, various forms of satisfaction could be substituted for punishment” 
(Erickson, Christian Theology, 814). Also, see Bruce McCormack, “Atonement.” 
48SCG III.142.5: “To the increase [either of good or bad] which depends on the number of 
works there must be a corresponding increase in rewards and punishments; otherwise, there 
would not be a compensation under divine justice for all the things that a person does, if some 
evils remained unpunished and some goods unrewarded.”
 SCG III.158.5: “If [a person] does not exact this penalty of himself, then, since things 
subject to divine providence cannot remain disordered, this penalty will be inflicted on him 
by God.”
 ST I-II.77.ad1: “The Divine law leaves nothing unpunished that is contrary to virtue.”
 ST I-II.87.3.ad3: “God does not delight in punishments for their own sake; but He does 
delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.”
 ST I-II.91.4: “In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished 
[impunitum], it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are for-
bidden.”
 CT 181, in a passage on why purgatory is needed: “The order of divine justice demands 
that punishment be undergone for sins.”
 Also, Bruce McCormack gives support for at least this general line of interpretation 
relating Aquinas to Anselm. “That ‘satisfaction’ might occur through punishment did not 
occur to Anselm, though it was basic to the thinking of a host of medieval and Reformation 
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be assigned for a sin.”49 That God punishes all sin is part of his work, not 
as a cosmic accountant, but as a governor. Aquinas writes, “The function of 
punishing and rewarding belongs to him whose office it is to impose the 
law. . . . But it belongs to divine providence to lay down the law for men. 
. . . Therefore, it belongs to God to punish [punire] and reward men.”50 
Punishing and rewarding are part of how God upholds this order.
How does punishing uphold the order? Aquinas holds that God main-
tains the good ordering of the world by subsuming breaches of that order, 
i.e., evil acts, back under an aspect of good: “We observe that every evil 
in things of nature is included under the order of something good. So, 
the corruption of air is the generation of fire and the killing of a sheep 
is the feeding of a wolf.”51 The good aspect under which God subsumes 
human sin is that of punishment. While sin consists in a human choosing 
to exercise her will her way—it is her pushing off or rejecting God’s or-
dering—punishment consists in God imposing God’s order back on 
the sinner.52 The response of punishment creates a kind of appropriate 
equality—in other words, justice, which is precisely the thing a governor 
is responsible to maintain. So, SCG 140.5: “This inequity is removed 
when, against his will, man is forced to suffer something in accord with 
divine ordering. Therefore, it is necessary that human sins be given pun-
ishment [puniantur] of divine origin and, for the same reason, that good 
deeds receive their reward.” Aquinas makes the same point in ST I-II.87.1: 
“Whatever rises up against an order, is put down by that order or by the 
principle thereof. And because sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that 
whoever sins, commits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put 
down, in consequence, by that same order, which repression is punish-
ment [poena].”
So, unlike Anselm, for whom God required satisfaction or punishment, 
Aquinas states that divine justice requires punishment; and Aquinas 
holds that undergoing punishment establishes justice in virtue of its being 
an act which “equalizes” one’s past offence. This confirms the suggestion 
of ST Supp. 12, that satisfaction, as an act of vindictive justice, involves one vol-
untarily performing an action that involves inflicting on one’s self a punishment 
(for sin) that God, in his justice, requires. Moreover, Aquinas explicitly affirms 
this understanding of satisfaction in SCG III.158.5:
After a man has secured remission of his sin by grace and has been brought 
back to the state of grace, he remains under an obligation, as a result of 
God’s justice, to some penalty [poenam] for the sin that he has committed. 
Now, if he imposes this penalty on himself by his own will, he is said to 
thinkers and represented a development whose importance [Gusaf] Aulén underestimated” 
(McCormack, “Atonement”).
49SCG III.142.1; SCG III.158.4
50SCG III.140.2.
51SCG III.140.5.
52SCG III.140.5.
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make satisfaction to God by this: inasmuch as he attains with labor and pun-
ishment the divinely established order by punishing [puniendo] himself for 
the sin, which order he had transgressed by sinning through following his 
own will. But, if he does not exact this penalty of himself, then, since things 
subject to divine providence cannot remain disordered, this penalty will be 
inflicted on him by God. Such a punishment is not called one of satisfaction, 
since it is not due to the choice of the one who suffers it.
This understanding of satisfaction as involving voluntarily undergoing 
the punishment or penalty ( poena) required by justice explains why Aquinas 
does not need to employ Anselm’s “either-punishment-or-satisfaction” 
formula.
This interpretation of Aquinas on satisfaction might prompt the 
following objection: how can satisfaction involve voluntarily inflicting pun-
ishment on oneself, given that, for Aquinas, “the nature of punishment is to 
be against the will”?53 The question raises an important point, one which 
shows that for Aquinas, there is a difference between “satisfaction” and 
“punishment”—but the difference is not a matter of punishment. Aquinas 
writes the following in ST I-II.87.6:
When punishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of punish-
ment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will; and although 
satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against the will, neverthe-
less in this particular case and for this particular purpose, it is voluntary. 
Consequently it is voluntary simply, but involuntary in a certain respect. 
(Italics mine)
On Aquinas’s view, divine justice requires either “punishment simply” or 
“satisfactory punishment”—in either case, though, there is an imposition 
of divine order against the sinner’s will which removes the “inequity” of 
the sinful offence; in short, there is genuine punishment. And thus, we 
see why Aquinas can say that divine justice simply requires punishment 
for sin. Furthermore, understanding satisfaction as involving a voluntary 
undergoing of punishments required by divine justice explains Aquinas’s 
remark that the one who performs satisfaction makes, by their voluntary 
choice, “a virtue out of a necessity”: one chooses to undergo the punishment 
justice requires.54 Finally, as I will argue below, Aquinas understanding of 
Christ’s satisfaction as bearing our punishment for us, in our place, pro-
vides yet further evidence for this reading of satisfaction.
On the basis of these texts, then, I suggest that Stump (and Van 
Nieuwenhove) have rejected a function of satisfaction that Aquinas en-
dorses: satisfaction aims and functions to uphold the order of divine justice, 
which requires that sin be punished, and it upholds or “satisfies” this re-
quirement of divine justice by undergoing the required punishment.
53ST I-II.87.6
54ST Supp.12.1. Aquinas’s exact wording is “makes a virtue of necessity.” Thus, satisfaction 
involves an act which is somewhat contrary to one’s will, in a sense, but not to her actual 
choice; whereas “simple” punishment is contrary to will and choice.
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V. Punishment: Penal or Remedial?
Like before, though, how do we explain the texts to which Stump and 
others point? Specifically, what about Stump’s (and Van Nieuwenhove’s) 
claim that the function of satisfaction is remedial, rather than penal? My 
reply is simple: Aquinas does not pit the one function against the other. 
Indeed, he writes, “Satisfactory punishment has a twofold purpose, viz. to 
pay the debt, and to serve as a remedy for the avoidance of sin.”55 And, re-
garding justice itself, “Justice aims not only at removing inequality already 
existing, by punishing the past fault, but also at safeguarding equality for 
the future, because according to the Philosopher, punishments are me-
dicinal.”56 Clearly, Aquinas sees two purposes for satisfaction: remedying 
the sinner and penalizing them to establish an order of justice otherwise 
infringed upon by their past sin.57
That these two purposes can be co-present seems plausible. Imagine 
a medicine that is repugnant to take, but which made the one who took 
it more obedient to one’s parents. After a fit of a child’s disobedience, a 
parent might administer it to her child for both its effects. (On this illus-
tration, satisfaction could consist in the child voluntarily choosing to take it 
after a fit of disobedience). This seems to be precisely what Aquinas has 
in mind. A penalty or punishment ( poena) is imposed upon us because it 
is just; but that which is imposed on us is also for our good. In the simul-
taneously penal and remedial nature of the punishments of satisfaction, 
we see God’s justice and his mercy operating in a unity, at one and the 
same time. Interestingly, Aquinas holds that God’s “justice and mercy are 
present in all God’s works.”58 Satisfaction’s remedial purpose need not 
undermine its penal one.
We should consider one more objection, however. In SCG III.158, 
Aquinas writes that one’s love for God and one’s remorse for sin may be 
so strong that the need for “the punishments of satisfaction” is removed.59 
Punishments are medicine that is “necessary so that the mind may adhere 
more firmly to the good.”60 But sometimes, the mind is already so bonded 
to God that the medicine—the undergoing of punishment by which one 
makes satisfaction—is not needed. Thus, in this passage, Aquinas seems 
to say that punishments are necessary only as a means to the end of the 
restoration of one’s love, since on account of already possessing that end 
(love for God), the means (punishment) is said to be not necessary. But if 
punishments are necessary only as a means to the end of the restoration of 
love, they are not necessary for justice’s sake.
55ST Supp.13.2.
56ST Supp.12.3
57See also CT 121: “Punishment is inflicted as a medicine that is corrective of the sin, and 
also to restore right order violated by the sin.”
58ST I.21.4.
59SCG III.158.6. 
60SCG III.158.6.
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But a close reading of the passage suggests otherwise. In the text, 
Aquinas steadily utilizes a two-part structure (marked below with “[1]” 
and “[2]”). He notes that punishment is necessary for two reasons. First, 
so that “the mind may adhere more firmly to the good,” and second, “so 
that the order of justice may be observed,” which happens by the sinner 
“standing the penalty.” He then notes, first, that a strong love for God is 
sufficient to direct one to the good, and second, that “displeasure for a past 
fault, when intense, brings great sorrow.” “Consequently,” he writes (and 
the inferential nature of the claim is important), “through [1] the strength 
of one’s love for God, and [2] of one’s hatred of past sin, there is removed 
the need for punishments of satisfaction.” The structure of the passage in-
dicates not that satisfaction is forgone but that the intense sorrow over sin 
is its own experience of a penal punishment for sin. It is on account of this 
punishment that no other punishment is needed. And the already-present 
love means that (further) punishment is also not needed for the sake of 
remedy. Both purposes of the punishments of satisfaction can sometimes 
be fulfilled in an affective realm. Here, too, then, satisfaction’s penal nature 
and juridical function should not be undermined by reference to the reme-
dial purpose of the punishments of satisfaction. 
VI. Satisfaction in Christ’s Passion
So far, I have argued, first, that Aquinas holds that God’s justice (based 
on God’s will) requires satisfaction for the remission of sin. Second, I 
contended that satisfaction involves the voluntary undergoing of the 
punishment ( poena) justice requires, and functions to uphold an order 
of justice that requires that punishment be meted out. I noted how this 
marks Aquinas off from Anselm (for whom satisfaction was an alterna-
tive to punishment), and that this penal purpose of satisfaction need not 
compete with its remedial one, since Aquinas affirms them both. In this 
penultimate section I will consider Aquinas’s understanding of Christ’s 
death, in its work of making satisfaction for sin.
Note that much of the task of interpreting the nature of Christ’s death 
as a work of satisfaction lies in discerning Aquinas’s understanding of the 
nature of satisfaction. After all, to say that one of the functions of Christ’s 
death is to make satisfaction for humanity’s sin obviously applies one’s 
understanding of satisfaction to the atonement. As such, insofar as Christ’s 
death does function as a work of satisfaction, and insofar as he does not 
make satisfaction for his own sins, the argument above on the nature of sat-
isfaction (Sections III–V) has already given substantial reason to think that 
the efficacy of Christ’s death involves and draws on Christ undergoing a 
punishment that justice requires, in order to satisfy that requirement for 
us. Nonetheless, it is helpful to consider directly Aquinas understanding 
of Christ’s death.
Given the account of the nature of satisfaction I offered above, one 
would expect that in speaking of Christ’s atonement as a work of satis-
faction, penalty or punishment, and substitution would be important 
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concepts. One would expect Aquinas to say that one way Christ’s death 
has salvific efficacy is in virtue of his taking upon himself the penalty or 
punishments assigned by justice for our sins. And—despite Stump’s and 
Van Nieuwenhove’s (and to some extent Cessario’s) claims—one finds ex-
actly that in Aquinas.
In CT 231, Aquinas writes, “Christ wished to suffer not only death, but 
also the other ills that flow from the sin of the first parent to his posterity, 
so that, bearing in its entirety the penalty [poenam] of sin, He might perfectly 
free us from sin by offering satisfaction.”61 Humanity incurred a penalty 
for their sin; but Christ freed humanity from that penalty by bearing it for 
them—and this was the content of his work of satisfaction.
In CT 227, Aquinas issues the same idea, invoking such legal language 
as “sentence,” “charge,” “debt,” and “penalty”:
Christ willed to submit to death for our sins so that, in taking on Himself 
without any fault of His own the punishment charged against us, He might 
free us from the death to which we had been sentenced, in the way that 
anyone would be freed from a debt of penalty if another person undertook 
to pay the penalty for him.
The text clearly affirms a penal and substitutionary nature of the function 
of Christ’s death, just in that there is one punishment or penalty due to hu-
mans, and Christ substitutes himself as the “payer” of that punishment. 
Moreover, the text suggests that Christ did not just undergo the same kind 
of experience as that due to humanity in consequence of their sin, but 
that he took on himself humanity’s very punishment; he paid humans’ 
particular debt.
Also, CT 228:
Christ’s death was suitable as a salutary means of satisfaction. [For] Man is 
fittingly punished in the things wherein he has sinned. . . . But the first sin of 
man was the fact that he ate the fruit . . . , contrary to God’s command. In his 
stead Christ permitted Himself to be fastened to a tree, so that He might pay 
for what He did not carry off.62
Christ pays, as a substitute, the debt of punishment we owed; he bears our 
punishment “in our stead;” he dies the death due to us.
It is not just in CT that Aquinas sees Christ as making satisfaction by 
bearing in humanity’s place, as its substitute, the punishment for human 
sin required by divine justice. He gives the same account in SCG IV.55.22:
Christ had to suffer death . . . to wash away the sins of others. This indeed 
took place when He who was without sin willed to suffer the penalty [poe-
nam] due to sin that He might take on Himself the penalty due to others, and 
make satisfaction for others. And although the grace of God suffices by itself 
for the remission of sins . . . nonetheless in the remission of sin something is 
required on the part of him whose sin is remitted: namely, that he satisfy the 
61CT 231, emphasis mine. 
62Emphasis mine. 
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one offended. And since other men were unable to do this for themselves, 
Christ did this for all by suffering a voluntary death out of charity.
Whereas we owed God satisfaction in virtue of our debt of punishment, 
Christ makes satisfaction for us, by “taking on Himself the penalty due to 
others,” so those others, i.e., sinful humans, would not have to. I conclude, 
then, that Stump’s third denial is incorrect: Aquinas does maintain that 
one way Christ’s death functions is as a substitute bearer of a penalty or 
punishment, even one required by divine justice.
VII. Aquinas and Penal Substitution Theory
I have argued that Aquinas maintains three positions, each of which 
Stump takes Aquinas to deny: A1) that divine justice (based on the di-
vine will) requires satisfaction; A2) that satisfaction involves undergoing 
punishment in order to satisfy a requirement of divine justice that sin be 
punished; and A3) that one way in which Christ’s death has saving effect 
is that he bears the punishment required by justice for us, in our place, 
thereby freeing us from the debt of punishment.
I wish now to consider one important implication of my argument, an 
implication that concerns how Aquinas’s account relates to other accounts 
of the atonement. Recall that Stump’s three claims (S1–S3) were presented 
as key ways in which Aquinas’s account diverged from the popular ac-
count of the atonement. In defending the exact opposite of Stump’s three 
claims, my interpretation suggests a much more positive relationship 
between Aquinas and Stump’s popular account of the atonement—and 
between Aquinas’s account and the account represented by the popular 
account.
Consider the following 4-point account of the atonement, which also 
captures the heart of Stump’s popular account:63
1) Divine justice requires “penalty” or “punishment” ( poena) for sin.
2) The fact that humans have sinned means that a “sentence,” “debt” 
or “penalty” of punishment ( poena) accrues to them; the sinner in-
curs the obligation of seeing to it that the penalty is undergone.
3) Christ’s passion functions by way of his bearing humans’ punish-
ment ( poena), for them, as their substitute.
4) This “bearing of punishment” is salvific for humanity in virtue of its 
“exhausting” the requirement of punishment for sin. Humans do 
not need to bear the required punishment because the requirement 
was satisfied when the punishment was borne by the substitute.
As Sections III–VI attest, Aquinas, according to my argument, agrees 
with all four points of this account (with the important qualification that 
“this justice is based on the divine will”). While that itself is an important 
63Recall Stump’s description of the popular account given in footnote 1 above. 
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correction to Stump’s account, we discern a further implication of the 
reading defended here when we observe that (1)–(4) also forms a recogniz-
ably even if basic “penal substitution” account of the atonement. Of course, 
one might object that PST holds that God punishes Jesus, and so we first 
need to consider whether Aquinas’s talk of “Christ bearing our punish-
ment” really amounts to talk of Christ being punished by God.64 While this 
distinction is important, leaving it for another occasion does not prevent us 
from saying that (1)–(4) itself merit being called a “basic PST.”65 Like PST, 
(1)–(4) focuses on a requirement of divine justice for punishment; it sees a 
plight facing sinful humanity in virtue of that requirement; and it under-
stands Christ’ death in terms of substitution in fulfilling that requirement. 
Thus, insofar as we take for granted the penal-substitutionary character of 
(1)–(4), which it clearly appears to bear, my account of Aquinas on satis-
faction suggest that, contra Stump’s interpretation, one part of Aquinas’s 
multifaceted account of the atonement resembles a basic PST—and not just 
“superficially.”
Conclusion
Stump’s exposition of Aquinas’s account of the atonement helpfully 
conveys to a wider philosophical audience some of the non-juridical, 
non-penal-substitutionary functions Aquinas ascribes to Christ’s death. 
Yet in her exposition, Stump claims not merely that Aquinas goes beyond 
a popular though philosophically embattled penal-substitution-style ac-
count of the atonement; she claims that Aquinas rejects (or at least does 
not endorse) the account as such. I have argued that this further, negative 
claim is incorrect. For Aquinas, divine justice does require satisfaction, al-
beit freely; satisfaction involves voluntarily undergoing punishment for 
sin required by divine justice; and one way Christ’s death functions is by 
his “bearing the punishment” required by justice for us, in our place, to 
free us from our debt of punishment.66
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